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Abstract. Patch-based attacks introduce a perceptible but localized
change to the input that induces misclassification. A limitation of cur-
rent patch-based black-box attacks is that they perform poorly for tar-
geted attacks, and even for the less challenging non-targeted scenarios,
they require a large number of queries. Our proposed PatchAttack is
query efficient and can break models for both targeted and non-targeted
attacks. PatchAttack induces misclassifications by superimposing small
textured patches on the input image. We parametrize the appearance
of these patches by a dictionary of class-specific textures. This texture
dictionary is learned by clustering Gram matrices of feature activations
from a VGG backbone. PatchAttack optimizes the position and texture
parameters of each patch using reinforcement learning. Our experiments
show that PatchAttack achieves > 99% success rate on ImageNet for a
wide range of architectures, while only manipulating 3% of the image for
non-targeted attacks and 10% on average for targeted attacks. Further-
more, we show that PatchAttack circumvents state-of-the-art adversarial
defense methods successfully. The code is publicly available here.
Keywords: Adversarial Machine Learning; Black-box Attack
1 Introduction
Computer vision models have achieved strong performance on image recognition
tasks, however, they are known to be vulnerable against adversarial examples
[49]. Adversarial examples are modifications of images crafted to induce misclas-
sification. Understanding the vulnerability of computer vision models to adver-
sarial attacks has emerged as an important research area, providing opportunities
for understanding and improving computer vision models.
Recent works have introduced very successful attacks in the white-box set-
ting [20,34,9], where both the network architecture and parameters are available
to the attacker. In real-world applications, a more common attacking scenario
is that the attacker only has access to the model’s input and the predicted out-
put, e.g. , attacking popular image analysis APIs [2,1,25,26,22,21] or self-driving
cars [6,39,50,12,40,48,15,28]. This black-box scenario is challenging because ad-
versarial modification of the input must be computed without access to the loss
gradient of the model.
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Fig. 1. Illustration of our black-box texture-based patch attack via reinforcement
learning (RL): (1) The RL agent selects the patch position in the input image and
(2) selects a texture image for the target category (lionfish in this example) from our
learned texture dictionary. (3) The agent selects a patch position in the texture image
to extract a texture patch, (4) which is then superimposed on the input image. (5) The
adversarial image is fed into the deep convolutional network (DCNN). (6) The output
scores of the DCNN is used to calculate the reward for the optimization of the agent.
This six step process is repeated until the DCNN is attacked successfully.
Two paradigms have emerged for black-box attacks. Perturbation-based meth-
ods introduce imperceptible changes to the image that are constrained to have a
small norm but are typically applied to the whole input image [37,38,10,51,5,4].
Recently, several defense methods have shown that perturbation-based attacks
can be successfully defended [20,31,34,53].
In this paper, we study a complementary type of adversary, Patch-based
black-box attacks, introducing a perceptible (large norm) but localized change
to the input. In their pioneering work, Fawzi et al. [16] show that superimpos-
ing monochrome black patches onto images generated by random search can
successfully induce misclassificataions. However, a major limitation of current
patch-based black box attacks is that they perform poorly on targeted attacks
and require large amounts of queries for non-targeted attacks (Experiments 4.2).
In this work, we introduce PatchAttack, a patch-based black-box attack that
is query efficient and achieves very high success rates for both targeted and
non-targeted attacks. Our main contributions are two fold: 1) We formulate the
search over the position and shape of adversarial patches as a reinforcement
learning problem. Hence, we define the attack as a decision-making process of
an agent that interacts with its’ environment (the model) by taking actions
(placing patches in the image) and observing rewards (misclassification rates).
In this way, the parameter search is formulated as an optimization problem that
is much more effective compared to random search strategies in terms of query
efficiency. 2) Our experiments show that attacks with monochrome patches do
not succeed as targeted attacks. The intuition is that monochrome patches can
remove information from the image, but do not add any information, which is
critical to confuse a model in a targeted manner. We overcome this limitation
by introducing texture to the adversarial patches. To parameterize the texture
efficiently, we learn a dictionary of class-specific textures by clustering Gram
matrices of feature activations from a VGG backbone. The texture dictionary
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enables a query-efficient search over the patch appearance and leads to very high
success rates at targeted and non-targeted attacks, while also strongly reducing
the image area that needs to be corrupted for a successful attack.
Our results on ImageNet [42] show that PatchAttack achieves considerably
higher success rates for targeted and non-targeted attacks compared to related
work, while being more efficient in terms of the number of queries and the size of
the attacked image area (on average only 3% of the image needs to be modified
for non-targeted and < 10% for targeted attacks respectively). Furthermore,
we show that PatchAttack can successfully overcome Feature Denoising [53],
a state-of-the-art defense for perturbation based attacks. Finally, we perform
experiments with shape-based DCNNs [19] which were designed to overcome the
texture bias of DCNNs trained on ImageNet, and hence should be more robust to
PatchAttack. Interestingly, we cannot observe any increased robustness of shape-
based DCNNs, although PatchAttack is texture-based and the object shape is
largely preserved in the adversarial images.
2 Related Work
Sparked by the seminal works of Szegedy et al. [49] adversarial machine learning
has emerged as an important research area for understanding and improving deep
neural networks. In recent years, two complementary paradigms have emerged
for black-box attacks, perturbation-based and patch-based attacks. In this paper,
we focus on patch-based black-box attacks, but we also provide a short review
of perturbation-based black-box attacks as the search strategies for both attack
types are related.
Perturbation-based black box attacks. While we focus on black-box
attacks with access to model output scores, attacks with even more limited
access to model decisions only have been explored [7,29,11]. Such approaches
often require lots of queries and are therefore difficult to apply in real-world
applications. Early work on perturbation-based black box attacks with access
to prediction scores proposed to estimate model gradients with finite differences
[5,29,52,51,30,10]. In particular, these iterative attacks estimate gradients via
sampling from a noise distribution around the feature point. While this approach
is successful it requires large amounts of model queries. Other approaches use
evolutionary algorithms [3,30] or random search strategies [23,4], but still often
require many queries to be successful. A complementary approach is to compute
transferable adversarial examples based on the gradient of substitute networks,
[37,38,33,14,54,32,56,45,35].
The success of perturbation-based attacks has sparked an arms race between
adversarial attacks and corresponding defense mechanisms [20,31,34,53]. A par-
ticularly successful defense method is feature denoising [53], where the features in
a neural network are denoised using non-local means during adversarial training.
To the best of our knowledge, this defense mechanism has not been successfully
broken yet. In our experiments, we show that our patch-based attack can defeat
this defense successfully.
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Patch-based white box attacks Tom et. al. [8] proposed adversarial patch
as a white-box attack to cause classification errors. They craft adversarial ex-
amples by superimposing a patch onto the input image. Given a deep network,
the pattern of the patch is optimized using gradient descent. The trained patch
performs well but overfits to the network architecture. As shown in their ex-
periments, the patches trained from four different networks are still not able to
confuse a fifth network with a high success rate when the patch area is less than
10%. We perform transferability experiments in Appendix E.
Patch-based black box attacks. The seminal work of Fawzi et al. [16]
introduced patch-based black box attacks. They don’t optimize the pattern of
the patches, and instead use the monochrome patches. The position and shape
of the rectangular patches was searched using Metropolis-Hastings sampling.
We refer their attack as Hastings Patch Attack (HPA). While their approach
is successful, the random search strategy requires many queries. Furthermore,
our experimental results show that using monochrome patches only to craft
adversarial examples leads to very low success rates and even then requires to
cover more than 70% of the image(see Experiments 4.2).
We introduce a patch-based black-box attack using textured patches that is
optimized with reinforcement learning. Our approach is significantly more query
efficient, achieves > 99% success rates on targeted and non-targeted attacks and
modifies only very small areas of the input image.
3 Methods
In this section, we first discuss the mathematical framework for patch-based ad-
versarial attacks (Section 3.1). In Section 3.2 we introduce our reinforcement
learning (RL) framework for patch-based black-box attacks. Finally, we discuss
how the texture of adversarial patches can be optimized efficiently using RL by
parametrizing the appearance of the patch with a class-specific texture dictio-
nary learned by clustering Gram matrices of feature activations from a DCNN
backbone (Section 3.3).
3.1 Mathematical Framework
We denote a deep neural network as a function y = f(x;θ), where x, θ and y
denote the input image, model parameters, and output score of the model after
softmax. To perform an adversarial attack we optimize an objective function:
L (y, y′) , where y = f (g (x) ;θ) , (1)
where L is the loss between the output of the neural network y and a target class
y′ with y denoting the ground truth label. g(x) denotes the adversarial example
obtained by perturbing x. For targeted attacks, the goal is to induce a high
confidence score for the class y′ while non-targeted attacks, it is only to induce
misclassifications. In perturbation-based attacks, g(·) modifies x at every pixel
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and the perturbation is constrained to have a small norm. In contrast, the only
constraint for patch-based attacks is that the perturbation must be localized in
a small region E :
g (x) :
{
xu,v = T (xu,v) , if (u, v) ∈ E
xu,v = xu,v, otherwise
(2)
E = s (x, f(·, θ),S) ⊆ {(u, v) |u ∈ [0, H) , v ∈ [0,W )} (3)
H, W are the height and width of a image, u, v are the pixel coordinates. T(·) is
the transformation function applied to pixels inside E . To determine E , a search
mechanism s(·) is defined over a search space S of potential image areas. The
optimal region E∗ depends on the input image x and the neural network f(·, θ).
HPA uses Metropolis Hastings sampling to search the space S defined in Eq 4.
3.2 Patch Search with Reinforcement Learning
In this section, we propose our Monochrome Patch Attack (MPA). In general,
this black-box attack uses monochrome rectangular patches which do not have
patterns but have variable sizes and positions. We formulate the search over the
position and size of adversarial patches as a reinforcement learning problem. The
environment consists of x and f(·, θ), and an agent A is trained to sequentially
place monochrome patches in the input image. The search space is defined as:
S = {(u11, v21 , u31, v41 , · · · , u1C , v2C , u3C , v4C)} (4)
where C is the number of patches and each element in this set represents the
coordinates of C pair of opposite corner points with each pair determining one
rectangular region. S has 4C dimensions therefore we set the agent to take 4C
actions in sequence to generate a ∈ S. We formulate the attack in the following:
A(θA) : P (at|(a1, · · · , at−1), f(·; θ),x) t = {1, · · · , 4C} (5)
r =
{
ln y′ −A (a) /σ2, target attack
ln(1− y)−A (a) /σ2, non-target attack (6)
MPA :

E = J (a)
T (xu,v) = 0
L = −r · ln P
(7)
Similar to [41,46], we define A to be a combination of an LSTM and a fully
connected layer which represents a policy network with θA being its parameters.
At step t, the environment state is determined by previous actions, the deep
network and the input. The agent outputs the probability distribution over the
possible actions for step t as shown in Eq 5. Then it samples one action and
records the probability of the sampled action. In the end, this agent generates
an action sequence a and the probability sequence P recording sampling these
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actions at each step. J(·) : a → E is the function transferring a to the areas
formed by the C patches. The values of pixels in E are changed to 0 as shown in
Eq 6. Since x is normalized, the patch color is gray. The reward r for the agent
is defined in Eq 6, where A(·) calculates the area of E and σ controls the penalty
on this area. The loss function to optimize θA is shown in Eq 7.
Based on this framework, we further extend the search space to
S = {(u11, v21 , u31, v41 , R51, G61, B71 , · · · , u1C , v2C , u3C , v4C , R5C , G6C , B7C)} (8)
where R,G,B represent the values of the RGB channels of the patches, splitting
MPA into two variants MPA Gray and MPA RGB.
3.3 Texture-based Patch Attacks
Monochrome Patch Attacks (MPAs) are powerful in non-targeted setting, how-
ever, in targeted setting their performance is not satisfying (Experiments 4.2),
because MPAs only remove information at some parts of the image. The lack
of additional input signals prevents MPAs from performing targeted attacks.
However, we observe that MPA RGB achieves superior performance compared
to MPA Gray (Table 4.2), motivating our texture-based patch attacks.
A Class-specific Dictionary of Adversarial Textures. A major chal-
lenge when adding texture to patches is to find an efficient parameterization of
the texture to retain fast and query efficient attacks. Our solution is to build a
class-specific texture dictionary, where the patch patterns can be searched from.
Each dictionary element represents a prototypical adversarial texture of a target
class. Hence, to attack models trained on ImageNet, we build a dictionary with
1000 different categories, corresponding to the 1000 object classes in ImageNet.
Each category has 30 different texture images whose contents are extracted from
the ImageNet training set (see Figure 2 for examples of dictionary elements).
We generate the texture dictionary using a four step process: First, we ex-
tract class-specific textures from a set of images of the target class. Inspired by
style transfer [18,17], we use VGG19 [47] as the backbone for extracting texture
information from images. Let D be the fully convolutional part of VGG19 pre-
trained on ImageNet and it consists of 5 blocks. Let Fji be the feature maps from
the jth convolution layer in the ith block of D, and Gji be the corresponding
Gram matrix of the feature activations. Following the approach of style transfer,
we feed each image into D and compute the following gram matrices: G21, G22,
G23 and G
2
4. Subsequently, we flatten all gram matrices and concatenate them
into one vector G¯ that encodes the texture information.
In a natural image, not all the regions are equally important for the final clas-
sification. Often the backgrounds or other objects are not of interest. Therefore,
we need to extract only the texture of relevant objects in images and hence make
the extracted G¯ more semantically meaningful and increase the transferability
among different deep networks. In order to locate the relevant information in
each image, we perform Grad-CAM [44] on VGG19 for each image and mask
out irrelevant regions of the image before texture extractions.
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Fig. 2. Examples in our designed texture dictionary.
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The third step is to generate the texture embedding. For each category, we
conduct k-means algorithms on G¯s and use the 30 calculated clusters as the
texture embedding for that category
{
G¯1c , . . . , G¯
30
c
}
, in order to increase the
generalization property while maintaining the diversity of the embedding. The
fourth part is to generate texture images from the 30 × 1000G¯s to build the
dictionary. For each G¯, we optimize a texture image t starting from random
noise according to the objective function Ltexture = λ(G¯−Gt)2, where Gt and
λ denote the feature embedding of t and the weight. See details in Section 4.1.
Integrating the Texture Dictionary into Patch Attack Combining the
generated texture dictionary, we propose Texture-based Patch Attack (TPA).
Compared with MPA, the patches with the optimized locations in TPA are tex-
tured and provide more additional information, making TPA a powerful attack
in both the non-targeted and targeted setting.
There are two updates from MPA to TPA. First, the search space is updated:
S = {(u11, v21 , i31, u41, v51 , · · · , u1C , v2C , i3C , u4C , v5C)} (9)
where i3c indexes the texture image in category y
′ used to texture the cth patch.
u1c , v
2
c determines the patch position in x, represented by J(·)1t in Eq. 10. While
u4c , v
5
c denote the patch position in the i
3
cth texture image where we crop the
patterns as the texture of the attacking patches, represented by J(·)2t . Note that
in TPA, C instead of 1 agents are trained one after another. The cth agent’s
task is to find a position to put one more textured patch onto the image with
(c − 1) patches already superimposed by the previous agents. The number of
agents required to perform an successful attack C varies for different x. We set a
maximum number of the patches allowed to place and stop training new agents
if the attack is already successful or C reaches the limit. The second update is
that there is no penalty term on the patch area in Eq. 7, since the size of each
patch an agent can place and texture is pre-fixed. Different from MPA, the total
area of the attacking regions is well controlled.
TPA :
{
E = J1t (u11, v21 , · · · , u1C , v2C)
T (xu,v) = J
2
t ((i
3
1, u
4
1, v
5
1 , · · · , i3C , u4C , v5C))
(10)
4 Experiments
We conduct experiments on a challenging dataset, ILSVRC2012 [42], a popular
subset of the ImageNet database [13]. It consists of 1.3M training images and 50k
testing images with high resolution. There are 1000 object categories in total,
which are distributed approximately uniformly in the training set and strictly
uniformly in the testing set. The networks against which we perform the attacks
include ResNet [24], DenseNet [27], ResNeXt [55] and MobileNetV2 [43]. Since
our texture dictionary are built through VGG [47] backbone, we do not involve
this network to demonstrate the transferability of the texture images in the
dictionary. For MPA and TPA, we conduct baseline subtraction on the rewards
for the agents, and adopt early stopping when the difference of ln r averaged on
3 consecutive iterations is less than 1× 10−4, where r is reward.
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Fig. 3. Adversarial examples generated by TPA N1 4%. The first blue row shows the
ground truth labels while the second row the predictions of ResNet50. Each attacking
patch is textured by the texture dictionary, taking 4% of the overall area.
4.1 Texture Dictionary Setting
The texture dictionary is built upon the training set in ILSVRC2012. All max
pooling layers in the extractor D are replaced by average pooling layers with the
kernel and stride sizes both being 2. The Grad-CAM is applied, using the feature
map responses of the 5th convolution block of VGG19 to generate a attention
map whose values are then normalized between 0 and 1. We consider the region
with attention scores larger than the threshold 0.8 as useful. In the generation
of texture images, the Adam optimizer is used with the starting learning rate
0.01. The total iteration number is 10000 and the weight λ in Ltexture is 1× 106.
The texture dictionary is constructed with a two-level index structure with first-
level key indexing the categories and sub-level indexing 30 texture images of a
category. Figure 2 and Figure 3 shows some example texture images and how
the texture dictionary is utilized to perform attacks.
4.2 Attack Performance
In this section, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed attacks, Mono-
chrome Patch Attack (MPA) and Texture-based Patch Attack (TPA). The base-
line is Hastings Patch Attack (HPA) [16]. Both HPA and MPA Gray superimpose
three gray rectangular patches onto the image. Each patch can take an arbitrary
aspect ratio and an arbitrary scale. The updates of MPA RGB is that the patch
color is optimized. In TPA, we adopt the square patches and fix their sizes. We
set a maximum number of the patches which the algorithm can superimpose.
Therefore, the actual number for each image varies. For example, TPA N4 4%
indicates that each patch occupies 4% of the image and the maximum patch
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Table 1. Experimental results of the non-targeted attacks on a 1000 images randomly
selected from the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number
is 10000. Acc., Avg area, Avg qry denotes the classification accuracy, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average queries, respectively
Network Attack Acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
ResNet50
− 72.80 − −
HPA 0.40 18.05 10000
MPA Gray 0.00 6.57 9659
MPA RGB 0.00 5.41 9681
TPA N4 4% 0.30 5.06 1137
TPA N8 2% 0.30 3.10 983
DenseNet121
− 74.10 − −
HPA 0.10 19.82 10000
MPA Gray 0.00 6.87 9624
MPA RGB 0.00 5.73 9696
TPA N4 4% 0.50 5.13 1195
TPA N8 2% 0.30 3.13 1001
ResNeXt50
− 76.20 − −
HPA 0.80 19.22 10000
MPA Gray 0.00 7.88 9748
MPA RGB 0.00 6.23 9752
TPA N4 4% 0.70 5.21 1280
TPA N8 2% 0.50 3.25 1088
MobileNet-V2
− 68.80 − −
HPA 0.20 16.61 10000
MPA Gray 0.00 5.35 9578
MPA RGB 0.00 4.11 9603
TPA N4 4% 0.30 4.63 862
TPA N8 2% 0.30 2.74 756
number is 4. This means TPA is able to control the maximum allowed area of an
image to be occluded by the patches. There is no such limit on HPA and MPA,
which means TPA attacks are better controllable. Additionally, we provide com-
parisons between Hastings sampling and reinforcement learning in Appendix D.
The experimental results in non-targeted setting are summarized in Table 4.2.
In terms of accuracy drops, all the attacks achieve good performances against
all the networks, decreasing their classification accuracy down to less than 1%.
However, in terms of the average attacked area, HPA occludes 18.05%, 19.82%,
19.22% and 16.61% of the original images against the 4 architectures, while our
MPA RGB only occludes 5.41%, 5.73%, 6.23% and 4.11% respectively. Compar-
ing MPA RGB with MPA Gray, we find that optimizing the RGB channel of the
patches in MPA decreases the occluded area averaged over all the cases, from
6.67% to 5.37%. This proves that increasing the optimization dimensions and
improving the complexity of the patches is beneficial, motivating us to texture
these patches. TPA occludes the least area of the image with 3.10%, 3.13%,
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3.25% and 2.74% against the different networks. TPA N8 8% works better than
TPA N4 4%. In terms of query numbers, HPA is inefficient and always uses the
whole query budget since it takes 10000 samples and chooses the best one. From
MPA to TPA, the algorithm becomes more and more efficient with the query
times dropping from 9652 to 957.
For the more challenging targeted setting the experimental results are re-
ported in Table 2. Before performing the attacks, all the networks have a target
accuracy not larger than 0.1%. It is observed that although HPA increases target
accuracy to 23.05% on average, it occluded 71.54%, 71.68%, 72.57% and 69.45%
of the image in the four attacking cases, failing to be considered a successful
attack algorithm. For MPA, we use the RGB version since it has been proved
to be superior than the gray version in Table 4.2. Although the MPA can only
increase the target accuracy to 26.53%, it occludes much less areas than HPA
with an average proportion 17.08%. On the contrary, our TPA achieves high
performances. TPA N10 4% is able to increase the target accuracy to 99.70%,
99.90%, 99.70% and 99.90% against the different architectures. The other 2 vari-
ant TPA N10 2% and TPA N10 10% corresponds to two different requirements
for the attack. The first one provides the smaller occlusion area as it uses 7.80%,
7.87%, 7.59% and 7.78% of the areas respectively to increase the target accuracy
to 97.70% on average. The second one is more query-efficient as it takes 3747,
3970, 3538 and 4422 queries and obtain an average target accuracy 100%.
In both the non-targeted and non-targeted settings, MPA and TPA are supe-
rior to HPA to a large margin. TPA is the best attack among all the perspectives
including the accuracy/target accuracy, occluded areas and query efficiency.
4.3 Texture-based Patch Attacks Against Defenses
This section evaluates our attacks against popular defenses. As our MPA and
TPA are new types of attacks, we first test them on traditional SOTA defense
methods [53]. Another direction is to defend our attack with shape-biased net-
work [19], which is expected to be a good defense against our texture-based
patch attack. Additionally, we perform evaluation against the Local Gradients
Smoothing (LGS) [36] specifically designed to defend against the patch-based
attack in Appendix C.
Defense 1: Feature Denoising. In this experimental part, we choose Denoise-
ResNet152 [53] to perform MPA and TPA against. It is the SOTA defense against
traditional perturbation-based adversarial attacks in a white-box setting. In this
scenario, the attacker has access to the architecture and weights of the deep net-
work. This is a strictly easier setting than a black-box one. PGD [34] can only
decrease the accuracy to 55.7% and 45.5% after 10 and 100 iterations, respec-
tively. Our experimental results are summarized in Table 3. For non-targeted
attacks, both MPA and TPA successfully attack Denoise-ResNet152. MPA re-
duces the accuracy from 61.6% to 0.00% with the occluded area only being
0.48%, which is even smaller than those of any our previous non-targeted attack
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Table 2. Experimental results of the targeted attacks on a 1000 images randomly
selected from the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number is
50000. The target label for each image is difference from its ground truth label. T acc.,
Avg area, Avg qry denotes the classification accuracy on target labels, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average queries, respectively
Network Attack T acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
ResNet50
− 0.10 − −
HPA 23.20 71.54 50000
MPA RGB 25.90 18.45 28361
TPA N10 2% 97.60 7.80 15728
TPA N10 4% 99.70 9.97 8643
TPA N10 10% 100.00 15.36 3747
DenseNet121
− 0.10 − −
HPA 21.50 71.68 50000
MPA RGB 24.90 19.38 28088
TPA N10 2% 97.10 7.87 15920
TPA N10 4% 99.90 10.19 8953
TPA N10 10% 100.00 15.84 3970
ResNeXt50
− 0.00 − −
HPA 25.40 72.57 50000
MPA RGB 27.60 13.86 24738
TPA N10 2% 97.60 7.59 15189
TPA N10 4% 99.70 9.60 8223
TPA N10 10% 100.00 15.04 3538
MobileNet-V2
− 0.10 − −
HPA 22.10 69.45 50000
MPA RGB 27.70 16.64 28294
TPA N10 2% 98.50 7.78 15479
TPA N10 4% 99.90 10.39 8948
TPA N10 10% 100.00 16.85 4422
on normal networks in Table 4.2. The two versions of TPA decrease the accuracy
to 1.6% and 1.3%, respectively, both with the taken queries less than 1000. For
targeted attacks, the target accuracy for the network is 0.1%. Although MPA
only increases this to 38.3%, it is higher than that of any our previous MPA at-
tacks in targeted settings in Table 2. TPA N10 4% is able to improve the target
accuracy to 94.60%, reflecting the vulnerability of this defense against TPA.
Defense 2: Against Shape-biased Network. The textures of the patch play
a significant role in magnifying the power of our patch attack, as shown in the
comparisons between MPA and TPA in 4.2. According to this dependence on
the texture, the best defense against TPA is the model making predictions pri-
marily based on the shapes of objects in the images instead of being largely
influenced by their textures. Therefore, we consider the Shape-Network in [19]
as the current best potential defense against TPA. The Shape-Network is trained
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Fig. 4. Visualization of patch-attacked examples on ResNet50. The first row corre-
sponds to non-targeted attacks and the second targeted attacks with the target class
being leopard. More examples and their attention maps are provided in Appendix A
and B.
on the Stylized-ImageNet, which is created by conducting style transfer on the
whole training and validation sets of ImageNet, randomly changing object tex-
tures while maintaining object shapes in each image. By this design, the Shape-
Network is supposed to be insensitive to textures but rely more on shapes to make
inferences. Note that the construction of our texture dictionary used by TPA is
Table 3. Experimental results of the defenses on 1000 images randomly selected from
the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number is 10000 and
50000 for the non-targeted and targeted settings. Acc., T acc., Avg area, and Avg qry
denote the classification accuracy on ground truth and target labels, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average query number, respectively
Non-target Attack Acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
Denoise ResNet152
− 61.60 − −
MPA RGB 0.00 0.48 9287
TPA N4 4% 1.60 4.71 919
TPA N8 10% 1.30 2.91 867
Target Attack T acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
Denoise ResNet152
− 0.10 − −
MPA RGB 38.30 6.39 27464
TPA N10 2% 84.00 9.73 22196
TPA N10 4% 94.60 13.40 13932
TPA N10 10% 99.30 20.90 6920
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Table 4. Experimental results of the defenses on 1000 images randomly selected from
the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number is 10000 and
50000 for the non-targeted and targeted settings. Acc., T acc., Avg area, and Avg qry
denote the classification accuracy on ground truth and target labels, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average query number, respectively
Non-target Attack Acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
Shape-Network
− 73.70 − −
TPA N4 4% 0.50 5.19 1242
TPA N8 10% 0.20 3.17 1031
Target Attack T acc. (%) Avg area (%) Avg qry
Shape-Network
− 0.10 − −
TPA N10 2% 96.30 8.36 17443
TPA N10 4% 100.00 10.31 9229
TPA N10 10% 100.00 15.52 3822
also inspired by the style transfer dealing with object textures, as illustrated in
Section 3.3. So in principle, the Shape-Network is a very strong defense against
our attacks. However, the experimental results in Table 4 show that TPAs easily
confuse the Shape-Network with basically no difference as against a normal deep
network. In the non-targeted setting, TPAs decrease the network’s accuracy from
77.70% to 0.50% and 0.20% with the occluded area being 5.19% and 3.17% for
the two variants respectively. The average taken queries is 1137. For the targeted
setting, the three variants of TPAs increase the target accuracy from 0.10% to
96.30%, 100.00% and 100.00%, respectively. TPA N10 2% provides the smallest
occluded area 8.36%. TPA N10 10% is the most query-efficient with only 3822
taken queries but high occluded area 15.52%. TPA N10 4% is the moderate
choice with small occluded area 10.31% and small taken queries 9229.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we propose PatchAttack, a powerful black-box texture-based patch
attack. Our attack shows that even small textured patches are able to break
deep neural networks. We model the attacking process as a reinforcement learn-
ing problem with an agent that is trained to superimpose patches onto the
images in order to induce misclassification. Using monochrome patches only, we
achieve a strong performance on non-targeted attack, surpassing previous work
by a large margin using less queries and smaller patch areas. After enabling
the reinforcement learning agent to also use texture from an adversarial texture
dictionary, PatchAttack achieves exceptional performances in both non-targeted
and targeted settings. Furthermore, we show that PatchAttack breaks traditional
SOTA defenses and shape-based networks.
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A Adversarial Examples
Fig. 5. Adversarial examples generated by targeted PatchAttack on ResNet50. The
images in the same row are attacked with the same target class. The first three columns
correspond to clean images, Hastings Patch Attack (HPA) and Monochrome Patch
Attack (MPA), and the last three columns Texture-based Patch Attack (TPA) with
the single patch area being 2%, 3% and 4%, respectively.
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B Attention Maps of Adversarial Examples
Fig. 6. Attention maps of the adversarial examples in Fig. 5 generated by Grad-CAM
on ResNet50. The images in the same row are attacked with the same target class.
The first three columns correspond to clean images, Hastings Patch Attack (HPA) and
Monochrome Patch Attack (MPA), and the last three columns Texture-based Patch
Attack (TPA) with the single patch area being 2%, 3% and 4%, respectively.
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C Defense 3: against white-box patch attack defense
We evaluate our Texture-based Patch Attack (TPA) against Local Gradients
Smoothing (LGS) [36] which is dedicated to defend against white-box patch
attack on ImageNet. We perform the targeted attack on ResNet50 with the
same setting in 4.2 and show the result in Table 5. While LGS leads to slightly
higher patch area and slightly lower target accuracy, it clearly fails to defend
against TPA.
Table 5. Experimental results on 1000 images randomly selected from the
ILSVRC2012 validation set. T acc. and Avg area denote the classification accuracy
on target labels and average area percentage occluded by the patches, respectively
Attack Defense T acc.(%) Avg area(%)
TPA N10 4% – 99.70 9.97
TPA N10 4% LGS 97.50 13.25
D Comparison between Metropolis-Hastings sampling
and Reinforcement Learning
We implement the Hastings Patch Attack (HPA) in the same RGB and texture
search space used by Monochrome Patch Attack (MPA) and Texture-based Patch
Attack (TPA) to compare this sampling method and Reinforcement Learning
method (RL). The experiments are performed on ResNet50 with the standard
setup in 4.2.
Table 6. Experimental results of the defenses on 1000 images randomly selected from
the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number is 10000 and
50000 for the non-targeted and targeted settings. Acc., T acc., Avg area, and Avg qry
denote the classification accuracy on ground truth and target labels, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average query number, respectively
Non-targeted Acc.(%) Avg area(%) Avg qry
HPA RGB 0.20 16.88 10000
MPA RGB 0.00 5.41 9681
targeted T acc.(%) Avg area(%) Avg qry
HPA RGB 24.80 69.63 50000
MPA RGB 25.90 18.45 28361
It is observed that MPA RGB is better than HPA RGB, because it achieves
lower accuracy in the non-targeted setting and higher target accuracy in targeted
setting, while also using a smaller area and less queries.
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Table 7. Experimental results of the defenses on 1000 images randomly selected from
the ILSVRC2012 validation set. The maximum allowed query number is 10000 and
50000 for the non-targeted and targeted settings. Acc., T acc., Avg area, and Avg qry
denote the classification accuracy on ground truth and target labels, average area
percentage occluded by the patches, average query number, respectively
Non-targeted Acc.(%) Avg area(%) Avg qry
HPA N4 4% 1.10 5.42 3522.5
TPA N4 4% 0.30 5.06 1137
targeted T acc.(%) Avg area(%) Avg qry
HPA N10 4% 99.80 10.89 14345
TPA N10 4% 99.70 9.97 8643
Here we can observe that RL still is much more query-efficient than the
sampling algorithm, however, the methods are comparable in terms of accuracy
and occlusion area. This can be attributed to our improved search space for
performing the attacks, highlighting the importance of our texture dictionary.
E Transferability of adversarial patch dictionary
generated by white-box method
We implement Adversarial Patch (AP) [8], the white-box patch attack. We
first generate an adversarial patch dictionary (AdvPatchDict) consisting of 1000
classes by attacking VGG19 using AP on ImageNet dataset, and then attack the
other 4 networks used in our experiments with those patches in the dictionary.
The results are shown in the Table 8. In non-targeted settting, AdvPatchDict
decreases accuracy to 0.20% on VGG19 but only to 56% − 66% on the other
networks. In targeted setting, it increases target accuracy on VGG to 98.20%
but basically fails to increase it for other networks. Clearly, AdvPatchDict gen-
erated by the white-box method overfits to the architecture used to generate
them, highlighting the superiority of the design of our texture dictionary.
Table 8. Experimental results on 1000 images randomly selected from the
ILSVRC2012 validation set. Acc., T acc. and P area, denote the classification accu-
racy on ground truth and target labels, area percentage occluded by the adversarial
patch, respectively
AdvPatchDict
Non-targeted
Acc.(%)
targeted
T acc.(%)
P area(%)
VGG19 0.20 98.20 8.95
ResNet50 62.50 0.00 8.95
DenseNet121 57.80 1.70 8.95
ResNeXt50 65.30 0.10 8.95
MobileNet-V2 56.00 0.10 8.95
